A bureaucracy is a group of non-elected officials of a government
or organization that implements the rules, laws, ideas, and functions
of their institution.[1] In other words take over the rule of legislature, democratically elected representation of a nation.
http://cprid.com/history/31-Saeed%20Shafqat%20Pak%20Bureaucracy.pdf
Pakistani Bureaucracy: Crisis of Governance
and Prospects of Reform
SAEED SHAFQAT
This paper is divided into three parts. The first part provides an overview of
literature on how the role and assessment of bureaucracy in the Third World in
general and Pakistan in particular has undergone change. The second part examines
the changing socioeconomic profile and corresponding attitudinal changes if any, in
Pakistan’s bureaucracy. The third part provides guidelines for possible reform in
Pakistan’s federal bureaucracy.
ASSESSING BUREAUCRACY: A REVIEW
OF LITERATURE
For almost two decades (i.e. 1950–1970) the academic community presented
bureaucracy in the developing countries as engine of growth, development and an
agent of change [Lapalambora (1963) and Apter (1967)]. Bureaucracy in Pakistan
provided a lead and received laudatory comments for its role in initiating economic
development and promoting political stability [Huntington (1968); Von Vorys (1965)
and Braibanti (1966)]. Bureaucratic elites and public institutions were expected to
provide leadership, order and stability. Again Pakistani bureaucracy stood the test
and fulfilled these expectations [Huntington (1968)]. By the late 1960s that
witnessed movements of popular protest and agitation against the authoritarian and
repressive role of the government, the opposition political parties, and a segment of
the print media started portraying the bureaucracy as an instrument of oppression.
This portrayal had an impact on public consciousness. Bureaucrats were seen as
being inimical to their interests. By the mid-1970s the academic community and the
World Bank (both in their own wisdom and direction) began to reassess and reevaluate
the role of bureaucracy [Donell (1973) and Laporte (1975)]. In the early
1980s the World Bank studies began casting aspersions on bureaucracy’s ability to
promote order and development in the Third World. Corruption, inefficiency, bloated
size, absence of accountability, and resistance to change were portrayed as the
manifestations of bureaucracy [World Bank Report (1983–1993)]. The academic
community raised concerns about authoritarian values and corrupt practices that
Saeed Shafqat is Chief Instructor at Civil Services Academy, Walton, Lahore.
Saeed Shaf996 qat
bureaucracies promoted in the developing countries—i.e. violation of human rights
and suppression of liberties. The academic community recognised and conceded
some positive contribution of bureaucracy in the direction of growth and
development [Burki and Laporte (1986)]. In short negative images of bureaucracy
and a cry for reform dominated the policy and academic research environment.
In 1991, three papers presented by Boeninger, Mills and Serageldin at the
World Bank Conference on Development Economics brought the issue of
governance to the core of the debate on institutional reform [Boeninger, Landell-
Mills and Serageldin (1991)]. The World Bank economists conceded and recognised
that governance was no longer a matter of economic development alone. There were
cultural, political and institutional factors that influenced the process of governance.
These studies drew attention towards the fact that good governance was a function of
political will and commitment of the leadership, which in turn was affected by
cultural, historical/institutional settings of a country. That external environment i.e.
conditions of aid, pressures of donor agencies and international institutions also
influenced styles and modes of governance. In short, public policy debate underwent
a paradigm shift in which institutional reform i.e. reform of the bureaucracy,
judiciary, legislatures became the cry of this decade. Thus, the World Bank, IMF and
UNDP, provided the lead in initiating a dialogue on reform strategy for the
bureaucracies in the Third World. Given this context, how should one assess the role
of bureaucracy? What kind of leadership can it provide in managing public
institutions? What type of strategies can be adopted to build an efficient bureaucracy
that may promote good governance?
Bureaucracy is pivotal to modern government. This is recognised both by the
proponents and the opponents of bureaucracy. In a developing country what is the
primary function of bureaucracy? The answer could vary depending on the culture of
a society, its level of socioeconomic development and the nature of its political
system. In a traditional sense, in most political systems, bureaucracy has been
expected to ensure continuity of policies, political order/stability, uphold rule of law,
promote economic development and cultural cohesion. These traditional functions
have been forcefully defended by the proponents of bureaucracy.
If one were to look at the performance of bureaucracy in the Third World the
results are mixed. In most countries of South Asia, the authority and social elite
status of bureaucracy is still recognised; despite erosion of power and politicisation.
Its major failure is in its inability to promote welfare, development, equity and
provide justice to the citizens.
Peter Drucker in a recent article “In defense of Japans Bureaucracy” makes a
strong case for elitism and continuity as hallmarks of a strong bureaucracy [Drucker
(1998)]. Elites of merit and function if respected in a society, as the Japanese case
demonstrates, do promote continuity and cohesion. Drucker argues that the Japanese
bureaucracy has performed these two tasks ably, despite other serious problems.
Crisis of Governance 997
Furthermore, Drucker asserts that in most developed countries, “Bureaucracy
dominates policy-making process. America and few European countries are an
exception” [Drucker (1998)]. This leads him to conclude that the:
bureaucratic elites have far greater staying power then we are willing
to concede. They manage to keep power for decades despite scandals
and proven incompetence.
He hastens to add, that without ruling elites most developed countries fear
social disintegration. It is this “staying power” that sustains continuity and enhances
the enduring capacity of bureaucracy. In the case of Japan, Drucker argues it has
worked well because it keeps the society integrated. The Japanese feel that their
society is fragile. Therefore bureaucracy as a ruling elite is considered essential to
ensure cohesion.
Drucker is so convinced of elitism and continuity as an enduring aspect of
bureaucracy as to assert that in some societies and situations “procrastination” was
wiser than action. To what degree the experience and functioning of Japan’s
bureaucracy is relevant to Pakistan? It cannot be denied that very much like Japan,
Pakistani society does give credence and legitimacy to its elites.
Broadly speaking in our context, the elites can be divided into two categories
i.e. elites of ascription—who enjoy position of power, privilege and prestige on the
basis of their descent, family, social class etc. Second, the elites of merit,
achievement and excellence. The latter enjoy a position of power, privilege and
prestige on the basis of education and professionalism. In most societies the
relationship between elites of ascription and those of achievement is complex and
Pakistan is no exception. In most developing societies the size of elites of merit and
achievement is small (although it is growing) and social class origins can be an
advantage for some and disadvantagious for others. The gulf widens because equal
opportunity of education is not available to all. Thus a symbiosis between ascription
and achievement is pronounced. On occasions in Pakistani context, it becomes
difficult to draw a distinction between the two types of elites. The newspaper reports
and popular writings have considerably blurred this distinction. Consequently, the
elites of merit and achievement have to struggle constantly to acquire legitimacy. It
is worth noting that in our case bureaucracy, (despite limitations and failures) has
been performing the task of ensuring continuity in policies. Secondly, despite
frequent and sometimes sudden changes of governments Pakistani bureaucracy
continues to manifest considerable “staying power” notwithstanding the charges of
corruption and inefficiency.
A certain degree of cohesion, staying power, organisational capacity to sustain
continuity of policies, preserve the status quo and maintain a semblance of stability
continue to be the hallmarks of Pakistani bureaucracy. Is it possible to bring out any
attitudinal and structural changes in the Pakistani bureaucracy?
Saeed Shaf998 qat
According to Osborne and Plastrick, the new gurus and out-spoken advocates
of Banishing Bureaucracy and Reinventing Government [Obsorne and Plastrick
(1996), Obsorne and Baebler (1993)], there is a need to redesign the “DNA” of
bureaucracy. The two argue that bureaucracy must be changed and restructured from
within. This would be accomplished by adopting the following strategy:
– To restructure public organisations to redefine their purposes.
– Enhance accountability.
– Provide incentives.
– Re-organise distribution of power, and most importantly.
– Change their cultures.
What is important to recognise is that the traditional concept of governance
(i.e. hierarchical, authoritarian, and emphasising chain of command) is under-going a
change. Instead, Osborne and Plastrick argue that reinvention is possible only
through “collaboration between elected official and the civil servant”. They also
recognise that public institutions were “designed to be stable”, but hasten to add that:
we have reached a point in history where stability is counter productive.
In today’s fast changing, globally competitive information age, systems
that cannot change are doomed to failure. They are like the dinosaurs,
which could not evolve fast enough to survive when their environment
changed.
This observation is pertinent because it clearly suggests that bureaucratic stability
without adaptability and capacity to innovate is meaningless and self-destructive.
It appears to me that Osborne and Plastrick are not advocating elimination of
bureaucracies, they are only “Whistle blowing”—i.e., if the bureaucracies do not
mend their ways they would face extinction like “dinosaurs”. The warning is timely,
as it has not only intensified debate on the degree and shape of bureaucracy in a
modern state but also provided tools and ideas through which public institutions may
be reinvigorated and strengthened.
There is a growing consensus among policy-makers, intellectuals and
international institutions that effective public institutions are essential for smooth
functioning of the state [World Bank Report (1997); Osborne and Plastrick (1996);
Turner and David Hulme (1997)]. This realisation is also growing that whereas
expansion and strengthening of civil society is a desirable goal non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) are no substitute for the government. Therefore public
institutions and bureaucracy are crucial components for good governance. The
challenge for the state is to reform and rebuild the public institutions that would be
competitive, enterprising and capable of upholding the rule of law. Thus reform in
civil service demands prudence and caution. Laws and procedures should be adopted
through transparent mechanisms, so that they promote merit, fairplay and
Crisis of Governance 999
accountability among public officials. Clearly, strengthening bureaucracy does not
mean preserving the status quo, it implies building the capacity to initiate change and
manage it effectively. The World Bank Report 1997, correctly states that:
Once poor systems are in place, they can be very difficult to dislodge.
Strong interests develop to maintain the status quo, however inefficient
or unfair. And those who lose out from present arrangements may be
able to bring effective pressure to bear for change.
In such circumstances public institutions become not only resisters of change
and innovation but also develop into instruments of repression, partisanship and are
portrayed as corrupt, unjust and inefficient. It is these images and perceptions that
evoke criticism from the opponents of bureaucracy—who demand reform and
innovation in the workings of public institutions.
The foregoing review of literature captures the debate on the centrality of
bureaucracy, its staying power, elite status, capacity to sustain, continuity of policies
and its reluctance to change giving rise to demands for reform and innovation in its
functioning. The challenge is: how to build a bureaucracy that is efficient, humane,
development-driven, is citizen-friendly and facilitates good governance and human
development.
In view of the changing socioeconomic profile of Pakistani bureaucracy, the
demands for reform and the changes it has undergone as a result of this reform effort
we may ask whether the reorientation of bureaucracy is a desirable goal?
DO CHANGES IN SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE
PROMOTE ATTITUDINAL CHANGE?
Pakistan had a small bureaucracy at the time of independence. However in the
past five decades it has grown and expanded and become a fairly large and
amorphous lot. Federal government employs over 5 lakh civil servants. Out this 90
percent are between Grade 1–15, while 10 percent are in Grades 16–22. Of these the
CSS officers comprise around 5 percent. The focus of attention and analysis in this
section are these powerful privileged and prestigious elites.
In the past five decades the structure of the civil services has undergone
enormous transformation. If one were to take the socioeconomic status (SES) and
education as two variables, those who joined the civil services during the decade of
1950 to 1960s, almost 70 percent came from the middle class, about 25 percent
belonged to the upper class, while those from the lower middle class were around 5
percent. About 60 to 65 percent had done M.A./M.Sc and 40 to 45 percent were simple
B.A/B.Sc. The average age of a new entrant to the service was 22-23 years [Ahmad
(1964) and Braibanti (1966)]. Has this profile undergone any change? Statistics for the
decade 1987–97 reveal that almost 88 percent describe themselves belonging to the
middle class, while 4 percent belong to the upper class, and 8 percent to the lower
Saeed Shaf1000 qat
class. About 75 percent have M.A/M.Sc degrees (including 20 to 30 percent doctors
and engineers) the percentage of simple graduates has declined to about 25 percent.
The average age of a new entrant to the service is 27-28 years (See Table 1).
Table 1
Years SES (%) Education (%) Av. Age (Yr)
1950–1960 5 LC
70 MC
25 UC
60 MA/MSc
40 BA/BSc
22-23
1987–1997 8 LC
88 MC
4 UC
75 MA/MSc*
25 BA/BSc
27-28
SES = Socioeconomic Skills (Lower class, Middle class, Upper class).
* (includes doctors, engineers).
Furthermore, a substantial number joining the Civil Services hail from the
urban middle classes. The Common Training Programme (CTP) data indicates that
from the 1st CTP to 22nd CTP (1973–1995) a total of 3,374 officers joined the
twelve federal services of Pakistan. Among these, the most prominent are the
children of the government servants (900) (i.e. sons/daughters of a clerk to a high
ranking officer) the second largest group is that of the offsprings of professionals
(515) (Doctors, Engineers, Lawyers), followed by Agriculturalist/landlords (514) and
businessmen (406). The number of children of the Civil Servants (i.e. CSS Officers)
is (167) and that of Defence Forces Officers (165).
Beside these other social and occupational groups in the society are also
adequately represented in the higher civil services (See Table 2). These groups,
Table 2
Composition of CSS Officers Background
[Data Based on Forms from (1973 to 1995)]
Ranking Background Numbers (3374) % of Total
1. Children of Govt. Servants 900 27.6%
2. Children of Professionals 515 15.2%
3. Children of Agriculturist/ Landlords 514 15.2%
4. Children of Businessmen 406 12.%
5. Children of Civil Servants (CSS) 167 5%
6. Children of Defence Forces 165 5%
7. Children of Farmers/Zamindars 277 6.7%
8. Children of Shopkeeper/Trader Merchant 77 2.2%
9. Industrialist/Private Sector 51 1.5%
10. Others 352 10.6%
3374 100%
Source: Compiled by Saeed Shafqat.
Crisis of Governance 1001
collectively constitute about 10 percent of the total CSS services. It is a myth that
civil servants and their progenies have a monopoly in the services as some
newspaper reports tend to convey. The data clearly demonstrates that since the
children of the government servants, professionals, business groups, agriculturists/
landlords, civil servants and defence officers have better access to education they
take and qualify the examination in larger numbers, therefore their dominance is
visible. It is again understandable that as compared to other social groups, since these
groups are more knowledgeable about patterns of authority and status associated
with various groups (i.e. DMG, Police, Customs, Income Tax), therefore in
identifying their service/group preference they are better informed at the time of
going through the CSS examination process.
Occasionally it does happen that despite attaining higher merit in the
examination, a candidate ends up in a service that does not correspond with his/her
merit position. This happens because of lack of information about the rankings of
various service/groups in the structure of the government. In this sense the
sons/daughters of civil servants have a definite advantage; they chose and join
services and groups that enjoy power, authority and elite status. Therefore upon
joining the service, despite being smaller in number they are more visible. This
happens because of two reasons. First, their parents may have held prominent
appointment as civil servants. Second, in our society where status is determined by
lineage, achievement is down played. This is newsworthy and promotes a public
image that parental connections compromised merit.
It is equally important to note that each year 1 to 5 cases of children of the
under privileged class (a daily wage labourer, taxi driver, a peasant, petty clerk,
shop keeper) have on the basis of competition, hard work and ability to excel
entered the service lending legitimacy and credibility to the Federal Public Service
Commission (FPSC) examination process, although in recent years the
interviewing process and composition of the FPSC has come under criticism from
various groups.
The change is visible and pronounced. The new breed of entrants to the Civil
Services is older, predominantly middle class and have a much more diversified
educational background. Education and social class are two indicators that give
credence to dynamic and modernist potential of the Civil Services of Pakistan.
Given this social class and educational background, in their attitude, these
new entrants to the civil services are politicised, pragmatic, adaptable, conscious of
power and authority that is vested in them. They also recognise the social utility of
greed that is prevalent in the society. Upon joining the civil services a substantial
number still cherish the ideals of honesty, integrity, public good and service to the
nation. Yet they are conscious of the fact that upon selection to the civil services,
they have become members of an “elite governmental club”. They argue, that it is
the civil society which bestows status upon them, develops unreal expectations and
Saeed Shaf1002 qat
encourages them to behave like a person who commands authority in public
perception. This public perception plays an important role in attitude formation and
influencing the conduct and behaviour of civil servants.
While choosing a particular service the new entrants have the following
considerations.
– What are the prospects of promotion in a particular occupational group?
– What type of legitimate perks and privileges are available?
– What is the culture of the service like—i.e. degree of ‘esprit de corps’,
prospects of horizontal mobility etc?
– How much symbolic value an occupational group has? This consideration is
influenced by public perception and premium.
– Finally, besides authority, prospects of making easy money is another
important consideration. Are these considerations any different from those
which were prevalent during the 1950s and 1960s? Is it a change in societal
values or individual civil servant who has become morally bankrupt?
Decline theorists insist that educational standard and quality of individuals
joining the civil services is inferior if not poor as compared to what it was in 1950s
and 1960s. In the eyes of the critics the structure of the services remains ‘colonial’
and ‘transformation’ has been ‘cosmetic’. In their perception civil servants remain
arrogant, corrupt, over-bearing, inefficient and self-perpetuating [Mufti (1998) and
Siddique (1999)]. They allege the structure of civil services is tottering apart, they
are on the decline, and they warn as we move towards the 21st century, the civil
services are ill equipped to govern or serve the people or meet the challenges that
confront the country. This criticism merits attention.
Recognising the concerns of the critics, it is contended that the Civil Services
of Pakistan have come a long way. They have revealed the capacity to adapt,
according to changing needs and political environment of the country. The service
structure has become broad, relatively open and competitive. According to Federal
Public Service Commission (FPSC) each year about 8000 persons apply for the CSS
examination (Estimates of (1991–1997), about 3,000 actually take the examination,
600 to 800 pass the written examination and depending on the vacancies available
with the federal government in the 12 Federal Services, 170 to 200 are finally
selected. Secondly, more senior positions are available to different occupational
groups, although dominance of the Civil Services of Pakistan (CSP) is visible at the
policy-making level—both in the federal and provincial governments.
An overview of 50 years of Pakistan’s history would reveal the need for
reforms in the civil services has been felt all along. Both civil and military regimes
have ventured to change the attitude of the civil servants, reform the structure of the
services to appease popular expectations, and expand their political control over
bureaucracy. Most of these regimes have pursued purges and reforms as policy
Crisis of Governance 1003
instruments to change the behaviour of civil servant and expand their own political
control. Each reform effort was preceded by a purge in the Civil Services of
Pakistan. President Ayub’s purge was followed by the Cornellius Pay Services and
Reform Commission of 1962. General Yahya’s famous purge of 303 was followed
by publicising the recommendations of the Cornellius Report, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s
1973 Administrative Reforms were preceded by massive purge of about 1300 civil
servants. General Zia-ul-Haq’s government was exceptional to the extent that it did
not pursue any systematic purge as a policy choice, but constituted the Anwar-ul-
Haq Commission to rehabilitate and promote some level of confidence, among the
Civil Services, particularly the CSP. In addition, it did what none of the earlier
purges and reforms had none—it embarked upon a policy to redefine the ideological
orientation of the civil servant by formally and informally encouraging a uniform
dress code, a culture of prayer-break during office hours, with minimal emphasis on
professional work ethics. Furthermore, the Zia-ul-Haq government expanded and
institutionalised the induction of armed forces personnel into civil services. Zia-ul-
Haq instituted a 20 percent quota in the Civil Services for the Armed Forces—10
percent to be recruited from grade 17 (i.e. Captain level) and other 10 percent from
Major and beyond and even those who may have retired from services in the Armed
Forces. Those who were inducted at the Captain level were placed in seniority above
those who entered the service through merit and competition. This had a
demoralising effect on the new recruitees. The cumulative effect of these measures
was that the modernist, forward looking, and liberal qualities of professional
competence were considerably eroded.
These purges and reforms shook the confidence of the civil servants, led to
politicisation and to a certain degree encouraged an environment where financial
corruption and misuse of authority proportionately increased. It is in this broader
context of purge and reform that the suspension of 87 civil servants in the early 1997
and subsequent formation of a Task Force for civil service reform may be examined.
During the first decade of Pakistan’s history the primary issues that attracted
government’s attention were rehabilitation of the migrants, building infrastructure for
development and institutions for governance. During this phase the officers of Audit
and Accounts, Railways and Indian Political Service (IPS) dominated the national
economic and political decision-making processes while the political leaders found it
difficult to develop any consensus on a framework for developing a political system.
During this phase of our history, the CSP chose to play an indirect role in politics. In
the process they consolidated their cadre, built their image and reputation as relatively
honest, efficient and dedicated civil servants. Unlike the army, the CSP, ‘did not take
any direct action to subvert the political activity’ as the real power holders in the
administrative set up. They did not challenge the politicians, rather left it to the
military, to confront and replace the facade of parliament in Pakistan. Yet the military
elites perceived the CSP as the real power holders and aimed to restrict their role.
Saeed Shaf1004 qat
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CSP 1958–1971
The military regime under General Ayub Khan provided a challenge and an
opportunity to the CSP. The challenge was that initially the military held the CSP as
partly responsible for creating political chaos in the country: Therefore they applied
pressure on the CSP cadre to mend its ways. In the first instance the military
appointed about 272 armed forces officers to important administrative positions in
the civil service. In the early 1959, it charged that 13 CSP officers had indulged in
“corruption, misconduct, and inefficiency”. After a summary trial the regime forcibly
retired the officers. This shook the confidence of the CSP cadre. [Burki (1969)]. The
military regime demonstrated that it meant business and would purge the CSP, if
they did not mend their ways. Thirdly, in August 1959, the regime appointed a Pay
and Service Commission, which was headed by A. R. Cornellius, the Chief Justice of
Supreme Court of Pakistan, who was known for his anti-CSP views. By such
measures the regime conveyed the impression that it aimed to reorganise and
restructure the services which implied eroding the power and privileges of the CSP.
The CSP were able to resist the challenge that the military regime posed. The CSP
showed pragmatism, flexibility and a certain degree of esprit de corps to reach an
understanding and compromise with the military regime. Finally, in the same year an
Economic Pool was created to manage the senior positions in the Ministry of
Finance, Commerce and Economic Affairs. 40 percent of the pool’s positions were
to be filled by non-CSP officers. The CSP perceived it as yet another effort to
undermine their position, as previously these positions were totally reserved for the
CSP.
According to the changing needs of the country, the Establishment Division,
devised a policy that starting from 1959, all CSP officers will be provided training in
fields pertaining to Economics, Public Administration, Community Development,
Finance, Accounting etc. Resultantly, by 1968, about 79 CSP officers had obtained
training in 17 American and British universities [Burki (1969)]. Braibanti records
that the Ford Foundation and USAID played a major role in building training
institutions and providing fellowships for the civil servants [Braibanti (1966)]. By
changing the direction of training to new fields, the Establishment Division was able
to not only strengthen the status of the CSP cadre, but also equipped a generation of
civil servants who could lay claim on professional expertise in financial
management, community development and good governance.
This new breed of civil servants, enthusiastically supported the two
programmes of the military regime, the Basic Democracies and Rural Development
Programme. Both these programmes, enormously increased the power, privilege,
prestige of the CSP cadre officers, who served in the districts. It also increased their
interaction with the local politicians. Consequently, although the district officer was
able to promote some sort of community development and welfare, yet as a cadre the
CSP ran into conflict with the politicians. In the rural setting of Pakistan, the
Crisis of Governance 1005
politicians perceived them as ‘political manipulators’ and ‘instruments’ of the
military regime.
Thus by conceding entry of the military officers to the CSP cadre,
reformulation of training programmes, and by enthusiastically supporting the
policies of the military regime, the CSP were able to protect their elite status. The
cadre was skillful in resisting and subverting the onslaught of Cornellius
Commission report and its recommendations. But in the aftermath of Ayub’s fall the
CSP could not retain their power and glory. Their reputation was tarnished and their
confidence was shaken.
CAUSES OF 1973 REFORM
Whereas the need for reform had been long felt, the immediate causes of the
1973 reforms can be analysed by focusing on the following three factors: student
disturbances of 1968-69, dismemberment of the country, rise of the PPP to power.
1. The student protest of 1968-69 which developed into a mass movement,
leading to the collapse of Ayub government in March 1969 also targetted
the bureaucracy, in particular the CSP. [Ahmad (1974)]. It was the structure
and attitude of the CSP that was bitterly attacked and criticised from within
the services as well as from the public in general. The CSP-bashing became
a persistent theme in the print media and public speeches in 1969. On the
2nd of December 1969 it culminated in the form of Martial Law Ordinance
No. 58 by President Yahya Khan. As a consequence of this Order, 303
Class-I Officers were removed from the service. Most of them were senior
civil servants; 38 were from the CSP and 78 were from the Central Superior
Services. This considerably undermined the power and prestige of the CSP.
It is interesting to note that this measure of Yahya Khan was widely
acclaimed by the media and opinion-makers of the country. Yahya Khan
was seen and portrayed as a leader who was trying to eliminate the corrupt
officers of the Civil Services.
2. The Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1971 leading to dismemberment of Pakistan
further undermined the position of the bureaucracy in Pakistan. The CSP
were further weakened as a cadre because 89 Bengali CSP officers holding
posts above Deputy Secretary level (28 of whom were Joint Secretary or
above), after the dismemberment of Pakistan opted for Bangladesh. Thus
considerably reducing the influence of the CSP as a cadre [Kennedy
(1987)]. Secondly, the media and the opinion-makers held the CSP in
particular and the bureaucracy in general for the dismemberment of
Pakistan. It was believed and argued that the policies made by the CSP had
led to the dismemberment of the country.
3. The electoral victory of the PPP in West Pakistan and the kind of attack on
bureaucracy that Bhutto and his party started during the anti-Ayub
Saeed Shaf1006 qat
movement emerged as an important contributory factor. It is worth noting
that in the PPP there were a number of left-leaning urban professionals who
advocated that the Civil Services of Pakistan needed a reform. They also
believed that the CSP were arrogant and anti-people. In public meetings
Bhutto and his party stalwarts termed them as “Noker Shahi”, “Brahmins”
and “Bara Sahibs”.
Bhutto having served in Ayub’s government (1958–1966) was aware of the
power and organisational capacity of the bureaucracy and was determined
to reduce their power. Thus it can be stated that a combination of personal
motive and the need for reform on the part of PPP and its leadership
provided the context for introducing the 1973 reforms. The 1973 reforms
were a radical departure from the established order.
IMPACT OF 1973 REFORMS
The 1973 administrative reforms although formulated in haste and never
implemented in entirety, considerably reshaped the structure of the services and
influenced the attitude formation, conduct and legal status of the civil servants
(removal of constitutional guarantees). The impact of the reforms was as follows:
1. The CSP, the Lineal descendant of ICS, was abolished. Its members were
regrouped into the newly created District Management Group (DMG),
Tribal Administration Group (TAG) and the Secretariat Group. Although in
1981 the DMG and TAG were merged as one group.
2. The long standing practice of reservation of posts in the top Secretariat
positions for the CSP was discontinued. As a result of All Pakistan Unified
Grade System the distinction between CSP, PSP and others was ended.
3. The various groups like Pakistan Audit and Accounts (PAAS), Pakistan
Military Accounts (PMAS), Pakistan Railway Accounts (PRAS) were all
merged into the Accounts Group.
The 1973 Administrative Reforms, although radical were, not very well
conceived nor sufficient effort was made to sustain the alternative that was to emerge
as a consequence of reform. The reforms were wide ranging than is generally
realised. They have considerably altered the structure of the services and promoted
the notion of equality among them. But they did not sufficiently emphasise the need
of efficiency, accountability and transparency in performance. However, they did
make the federal services more open, competitive and, at least, theoretically provided
equality of opportunity to all CSS services.
One of the salient features of the 1973 reforms that is not given adequate
attention is that it opened up the DMG, Customs and Foreign Service cadres to
women. The Police Service continues to be an exception to the rule. Though in one
recent case the widow of a police officer Killed on duty was inducted into the
Crisis of Governance 1007
service. Now since, 1973, each year depending on the size of recruitment in the CSS
i.e. 150 to 200, 5 to 25 women have been joining the twelve federal services through
the CSS: The average would vary between 5 to 10 percent of the total intake. These
women compete on open merit with no reservation of seats, or quotas for women.
Thus women who join the services are competitive, dynamic and despite difficulties
make a difference in the work environment.
The institution of Common Training Programme (CTP) has considerably
tarnished the glory that the CSP had because of exclusivity of training, reservation of
posts, differentiation of pay scales, etc. Training has made the service structure
relatively open, competitive, egalitarian and amorphous. However, the mystique of
CSP as the superior cadre still persists. Quite contrary to the popular perception that
a larger number of fresh entrants prefer to join the Customs or Income Tax groups,
preliminary estimates from 1987 to 1997 reveal that almost 97 percent fresh entrants
write DMG as their first preference, followed by Police, Customs and Excise and for
the fourth place Income Tax, Accounts and Foreign Service are in constant
competition. (See Table 3) It is interesting to note that despite purges and reforms
the ‘mystique’ of the CSP lingers on. DMG is perceived as the successor to CSP by
the new entrants as well as public and other interested groups. A combination of
intangible factors, the fascination, myth, perceptions about district, belief in
prospects of promotion, continue to attract the new entrants to opt for DMG.
Preference patterns reveal that in opting for an occupational group, candidates are
still driven by considerations of power, authority, prestige, status, etc. although the
occupational groups (Customs and Income Tax) that rouse hopes for financial profit
Table 3
Under Training Officers Preference of Service Groups in Order of
Ranking from 1 to 12 1987-1997
% Wise Ranking
Category I: Most Preferred Groups
Ranking: Top Most
DMG 97%
Category II: 2nd Most Preferred Groups
Ranking: 2–4
Police Customs
and Excise
Income Tax
85% to 95%
Category III: Preferred Groups
Ranking 4–8
Foreign Service,
Audit and
Accounts, CAT
60% to 80%
Category IV: Less Preferred Groups
Rankings: 8–12
OMG,
Information,
Postal Railways
MLC
80% to 99%
DMG = District Management Group.
CAT = Customs and Trade.
MLC = Military Lands and Cantonments.
Saeed Shaf1008 qat
are gaining salience. The Foreign Service and Accounts groups seem to have fallen
in the candidates’ scale.
TRAINING AND CAREER PLANNING
Training and career planning are essential for an efficient bureaucracy. In
1961 the government initiated an administration policy. In pursuance of this policy
the Pakistan Administrative Staff College and National Institute of Public
Administration were established in Lahore. Simultaneously the discipline of Public
Administration was also introduced as a Master’s degree programme at the Punjab
University. The thrust was to build training institutions and to prepare the civil
servants as good, efficient, administrators and policy-makers. However, the initiative
was lost early, as no effort was made to train the trainers for the training institutions.
Nor did the Establishment Division formulate any policy to link training with career
advancement and vertical mobility of the civil servants. Therefore those who joined
the training institutions as “some sort of professionals” and those civil servants who
were posted in the training institutions as ‘deputationists’, never really had their
‘heart and soul’ in training. The trainers at the training institutions developed into a
disgruntled lot because they did not have any cadre system. They were and remain
uncertain about their career advancement and prospects in the training institutions.
The civil servants in general have accepted a posting at the training institutions with
reluctance and hesitation. Rightly so, because posting at the training institutions is
considered neither meritorious, nor has a good reflection on a civil servant’s career
prospects.
Unless training institutions are given the status that they deserve they would
remain a temporary sanctuary for ‘out of favour’ officers. This would continue to
happen the civil servants recognise that training is a long term investment in human
resource development. Without professionally competent and motivated trainers,
training would remain an exercise in futility. As we approach the year 2000, once
again the FPSC, the Establishment Division, the controlling ministries, the training
institutions and on top of all, the political leadership in the country, have to think of
evolving a national training policy, which would prepare the Civil Services of
Pakistan to deal with the complex issues of governance.
The year 2010 will mark the end of an era, when all those who joined the
service, prior to 1973, would have retired, but to steer the course of action for the
21st century, a decision for the creation and sustenance of a policy-making group
will have to be made during this decade.
DEMOCRATISATION AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE
One of the major consequences of democratisation, particularly since 1988
has been that each regime change is followed by large scale postings and transfers of
Crisis of Governance 1009
civil servants both at the policy-making level as well as at the district administration
level. Resultantly, the civil services have become politicised and the concept of a
neutral, upright, citizen friendly public servant has been considerably compromised.
Political leaders and political parties forming a government need to take into
cognisance that governance cannot improve without developing consensus on the
desirability of an efficient, professionally competent, merit driven and non-partisan
civil service. For good governance political support and political commitment is a
prerequisite.
There are three challenges that have emerged as a consequence of the global
trend towards democratisation, privatisation, and internationalisation of world
economy. The Civil Services of Pakistan are confronted with how to combat these
challenges. The first major challenge is how to adapt and operate in a quasi
democratic set up? In Pakistan the transition to democracy is taking place, but the
rules and the spirit of democracy is being violated blatantly. Democracy implies
government by law, besides electoral competition, majority rule and respect for
minority rights and dissent. The challenge for the Civil Services is to provide an
anchor for democratic consolidation. Civil Services reflect continuity of policies.
Irrespective of who assumes political control, their job is to minimise conflict on
policies, develop consensus and ensure continuity. Given their education, training,
social background, they can play a pivotal role in strengthening democratic
institutions. For the past two decades, conflict among the political leadership has
polarised the Pakistani society. This polarisation has affected almost all segments of
civil society. The challenge for the Civil Services as an institution is—how to diffuse
this polarisation?
Good governance has two dimensions: Political and technical. The Political
component demands respect for law, acceptance of the rules of the game. More
importantly what is needed is commitment among political leaders to build
consensus through bargaining, negotiations and resolution of conflicts through nonviolent
means. Simultaneously we have to build and expand the independent press,
judiciary and parliamentary institutions. The technical component implies an
efficient, competent, corruption free, honest, professionally trained civil service. The
technical component demands training, career planning, acquisition of management
techniques and new skills by the civil services to enable them to perform the
functions of general welfare and national development.
A third salient trend of the recent time is the great increase in violence, that
undermines legitimacy of authority, polarises society and puts stress on the efficient
functioning of state authority. In most cases it enhances police functions of the state,
which in return has given a new twist to interaction among the district
administration, police and politicians. Consequently, criminalisation of politics is an
alarming trend in Pakistan. In addition politics of patronage and utilisation of state
resources for political purposes has led to a situation where a district administration,
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police—politician nexus is emerging as a salient characteristic of Pakistani politics.
This nexus if allowed to grow at the current rate, would result in the formation of
“Crime cartels” that have been witnessed in Latin America.
The future of democracy and the consolidation of democratic institutions in
the country depends not only on political parties but also on the civil servants in their
ability to rouse trust and confidence of the people through professionally competent
and honest management of the day-to-day business of the state in the service of the
people and the country.
GUIDELINES FOR CIVIL SERVICE REFORM
In the light of foregoing analysis, following policy choices are recommended
as broad guidelines for Civil Service reform—a reform that may lead to effective and
humane governance.
BUREAUCRAT, PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIA PARTNERSHIP
There is a need to evolve a balance between generalist practice and demands
of professionalisation. In top policy positions the leadership of the generalist may be
retained but professional’s advice and input must be encouraged and incorporated in
the policy process. Twenty five years ago a Pakistani scholar making pioneer study
of Civil Services perceptively suggested that “key posts” in government may be
assigned to “generalist-specialist’—someone with “sustained practical experience in
a single, well defined, broad area of government activity ... who displays special
aptitude for general management” [Ahmad (1964)]. Partnership between bureaucrats,
professionals, academic community on policy issues should be encouraged. It must
be recognised that internal changes in Pakistani society and external environment
have considerably weakened the monopoly of bureaucratic control on information
and resources. Bureaucracies now need professional input for project formulation,
project implementation and effective management. It demands a change in attitude
and re-definition of their role. Since bureaucracies play a pivotal role in policy
formulation, and development administration, therefore it is in their institutional
interest to work for such a change. To strengthen processes that strengthen good
governance, the bureaucracy needs to provide leadership in promoting a partnership
among bureaucrats, professionals and academic community.
PREDICTABLE DECISION-MAKING
Extra-constitutional pressures can be avoided through strong and effective
institutions, which demand upholding of rules and procedures that are simple, clear
and fair. This would require consultation among political leaders, parliamentarians
and the various agencies and departments of the government that must be routinised.
What is needed is decision-making process that is not only transparent but also
Crisis of Governance 1011
reflects consensus and continuity of policies. It requires initiation of such steps: (a)
Office manuals (OMs) be prepared about each activity. (b) Detailed Job description
be prepared for each post and quantifiable parameters be defined. (c) Criteria for
periodical performance evaluations be prepared relevant to the jobs. (d) Feedbacks
be obtained from concerned staff and also from institutionalised clients/interactive
NGOs etc.
TRAINING; DEVELOPING PROFESSIONAL SKILLS AND
ENCOURAGING ATTITUDINAL CHANGE
Merit alone should be the principal criteria for recruitment in public
bureaucracy. Training must be regular and conducted at all levels. Training must be
valued and the purposes and philosophy of training must be re-defined. Training
should enhance professional skills and raise level of motivation for public service. It
should also aim to bring about moral, ethical and attitudinal change in the public
servant so that the perception of government from being a “patron” changes to that
of a constitutional government. Training of the subordinate staff has been a neglected
area for too long. One of the serious failures of higher bureaucracy has been its
inability to regulate, control, monitor and evaluate the conduct and behaviour of
subordinate staff. This demands a three pronged approach: (1) Develop transparent
procedures of recruitment. In recruitment process recognised and effective NGO’s
representatives be allowed to observe proceedings especially interviews. (2)
Effective supervision that improves skills and conduct of the subordinate staff. (3)
Training to enhance the quality of services rendered to the general public.
STRENGTHENING POLICY LEVEL AND THE
FEDERAL SECRETARIAT
The 1973 Administrative reforms did facilitate integration among the twelve
federal services. They also ensured equality of pay scales among all groups/services.
However these reforms did not provide a clear vision and framework for equal
opportunity and prospect of promotion for all groups. This has generated rivalry
among the services which dominate the federal secretariat and in the process has
affected the policy-making process. It merits attention that a federal secretariat
devoid of federal spirit and character could increasingly become a burden rather than
asset for the federation. Therefore, there is a need to frame rules and procedures for
the senior positions, where merit, performance, ability to take decisions to innovate
is given weightage and not simply seniority or belonging to a particular service
group assigned on the basis of CSS examination.
The bureaucracy in Pakistan is not a monolith. It is divided into a number of
groups/services that are constantly engaged in a struggle for supremacy. Each
group/service is a functional entity. The CSP/DMG is both perceived and considered
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as the actual elite service: it is envied and emulated. This elite group has continued to
maintain dominance on positions of strategic decision-making in the secretariat and
at the district level. It is the Federal Secretariat which is becoming an arena of
competition and rivalry among services—because control over the Secretariat means
control over policy-making and the federal government. Ironically despite this inside
rivalry, in public perception the bureaucracy is seen as a monolith, gigantic and
united to rule, exploit and perpetuate the status quo. Yet deep down these groups are
inter-dependant and viz-à-viz other public institutions they show a tendency to band
together.
The workings, orientation and culture of each of these functional groups
varies. The dynamics of work, growth and prospects of vertical mobility are also
different. However, procedures, slow pace, reluctance to take initiative and general
apathy towards citizens’ welfare is a malaise from which the entire Pakistani
bureaucracy suffers.
The federal secretariat as a policy-making organisation needs to be
strengthened. Theoretically, at the Deputy Secretary level, the secretariat is open to
all services. But officers are reluctant to join because comparatively they have more
facilities and perks in the provincial governments. It would be beneficial if the talent
from all government departments is allowed to join the secretariat through a fair and
transparent competitive selection process. Besides other quantifiable considerations,
open competitive examination be conducted to induct people in the federal
secretariat (a classic example is of the Commercial Councillors recently. Only a few
privileged knew about the examination and were selected for postings outside). Posts
be reserved in each grade (out of the total) for each service group in Federal
Secretariat. The criteria for selection should be professional expertise, diversity of
experience, demonstrable leadership performance in public institutions; capacity to
innovate and accept challenging assignments.
It should be the right of every democratically elected government to appoint
persons of its choice in top policy-making positions. These persons could be
appointed from within or outside the bureaucracy on a three to four year contract
being performance based. What is being suggested is that once these appointments
are made they be allowed to act without interference and according to the rules.
FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION
There is a need to devise rules and procedures for freedom of access to
information. Currently, bureaucracy thrives on withholding information under the
garb of secrecy. Information on any—area of public concern (Including Customs,
FIRs (I.Tax) but its intra-working decisions also (e.g. budgetary grants, expenditures,
employee promotions, disciplinary actions etc.) must be available to citizens. The
government may levy a token fees for this purpose, but information must be
available readily. The freedom of access to information could make public
Crisis of Governance 1013
transactions transparent, it will minimise the usage of discretionary powers if any,
and would make the bureaucracy conscious of accountability. Once the civil servants
realise that any information from government can be obtained in public interest,
swiftly and at a small financial cost, their ability to use discretionary laws would be
restricted. Then discretion would be used only for public good and public welfare
and not against public interest.
RECASTING THE IMAGE OF THE CIVIL SERVANT
Civil Servants as enforcers of rule of law and implementers of policy are
expected to act as conscience of the society. Ideally they must be guided by what is
in the best interest of the citizens, and not of a particular person, political party or a
group. In Pakistani society, there is a growing gap between the self-image of a civil
servant—that he is achiever, holds authority, power and possesses superior intellect,
and that this has been demonstrated by the success in the competitive examination.
This self-image keeps the civil servant beholden to power and encourages
detachment. Then there is a public image of the civil servant—which is that the civil
servant is arrogant, aloof, authoritarian, corrupt, symbolising coercion and injustice.
Over the years this gap between the self-image and the public perception has
widened. This has put tremendous pressure on the civil servant and public scrutiny
has become harsher. Thus the onus of responsibility is on the civil servants to alter
this image. They need to project and perform not as rulers but as servants of the
public. Similarly the public advocates also need to re-look at the role of civil
servants, a little more objectively and specific to situations. In a culture where
familiarity encourages influence peddling, it becomes desirable that in public interest
and to impart justice and fairness, the civil servant may remain detached from
showing preference for one or other group. Impartiality, fairness, adjudication of
justice through transparency need to become the guiding principles of the bureaucrat.
ATTRACTIVE SALARY PACKAGE
To make public service attractive two conditions are essential. First, restore
the pride in public service by promoting merit and performance and by eliminating
safarish and patronage. It is difficult but not impossible. Second, provide an
attractive salary package—a package that has some semblance of proportion between
the elite status of the higher civil services (CSS Services), and the powers of
authority that are vested in them. One is not advocating a salary structure comparable
to private sector but a salary package that is competitive and encourages honesty and
integrity among the public officials. There should be salary/pay scales with regular
increments and then bonus increments to those who show excellent performance
over the last year. This should not be awarded on just the superiors’ evaluation but
on formal feedback of subordinates, evaluation of quantifiable work output and also
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weighing in some cases on the recommendations of established NGOs/concerned
public. Similar promotions to each grade especially from grade 17 onwards be not
just on the number of years put in and on vacancies but also on other factors (on the
basis as described above).
A formal feedback from subordinates, which is given some weightage in the
evaluation of the superior himself is necessary. This step would also give subordinate
staff confidence and would thus make CSS officer less overbearing. Individual
integrity is a desirable goal but institutional integrity is imperative.
DECENTRALISATION AND DEVOLUTION OF POWER
There is no gainsaying the fact that financial and administrative powers of
the provinces need to be enhanced. However there is need to build and
strengthen the local bodies institutions. Community participation would grow
and expand if we began to streamline structures at the district and tehsil levels.
At these levels the role of district administration needs to be redirected from that
of a patron to being an equal partner—a complementarity between the district
administration and local bodies—a functional specialisation—where the two
interact and strengthen public institutions at the grass root level.
At the local level the functions of councillors and the district
administration overlap. Traditionally the distract administration managed the
functions of recruitment, development funding/projects and collection of
Zila/Tehsil Taxes. The role of district administrator was both advisory and
paternal. The powers were concentrated in the district administration. However,
with expansion of political participation, democratisation and electoral
contestation, demands for devolution of authority have increased. The elected
public officials at the local and district level began to demand greater share and
control in recruitments, identification and implementation of developmental
projects and tax collection. This intensified conflict of interest between the
district administrators and local councillors. This conflict has affected
governance at the local level. To strength local government institutions,
enhancing community participation and devolution of power, it is desirable that
power-sharing mechanisms be evolved and strengthened between local public
office holders and district administration. Decentralisation has failed—the
answer to the problem is devolution of authority.
BUILDING TRUST: REDEFINING SUPERORDINATESUBORDINATE
RELATIONSHIP
A recent report by O.E.C.D on changing direction in management correctly
notes that:
Crisis of Governance 1015
Governance reflects a pluralisation of the important actors in governing
and in providing public service. The configuration of public institutions
is changing; the roles of super- and sub national bodies are becoming
more important; and semi-public and private sector actors are becoming
more widely and deeply involved.
Thus interaction is becoming less authoritative and more cooperative. This
demands an attitudinal change, because compliance through top-down orders alone is
becoming increasingly difficult. A public official’s skills to persuade colleagues and
motivate the staff to accomplish a task is gaining weightage. This demands building
a relationship of trust, confidence and credibility between a public official as the
leader and a subordinate as a functionary of the government.
Doors to higher position should also be made easier for subordinate staff, so
that they too have a stake in the system to work honestly and effectively.
Parallel Groups be created whose only job would be to address the problems
being confronted by the public (these parallel bodies are already in place but are
manned by their respective groups e.g. redressal from Income Tax is before I.Tax
Appellate Tribunal, etc. These invariably support their Peers). They should also
include NGO representatives if possible. Press may also be allowed participation.
These parallel institutions should also prepare periodical reports on the
functioning of the above and give it to press.
Detailed transparency documents of the functioning of each department/major
formations be prepared (by inviting people of diverse background and interest
groups) for example, PWD, I.Tax, NHA, CAA etc. These documents called office
manuals would replace the existing ambiguous subjective office procedures.
Financial Rules be drawn anew and be made easy and simple (e.g. now
officials have different powers to purchase the same thing under different
grants/heads of expenditure) Financial Rules are so complex (for the same reason
they are flouted than observed) that even a CSS officer of 25–30 years of experience
is ignorant about these and more often than not needs a shrewed person from the
subordinate staff to handle the purchase.
Thus the premium is on the personal traits, performance, reputation and
professional skills of the individual officer. Upon his commitment, credibility,
persuasive skills and professional expertise depends the performance of the staff.
Credibility and performance of public institutions is dependant on the quality of
manpower. If the quality of manpower declines, the decay of public institutions
follows. To arrest the decay of public institutions one needs to invest in the human
capital—the focus has to be strengthening personal integrity and professional
expertise of the manpower.
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CONCLUSION
From the review of literature, changing socioeconomic profile and attitude
formulation among the federal bureaucrats we can conclude that despite limitations,
the elite status and staying power of the bureaucracy is generally recognised, this is
particularly more pronounced in Pakistan. Here again like most of the Third World
states signs of erosion are visible. Bureaucratic institutions are certainly in a disarray
if not in decline. There are two options available: first, a radical restructuring of the
existing bureaucratic order. Secondly, a piece-meal but holistic reform of the existing
bureaucratic institutions. In this paper, I have opted for the second option, and
provided guide lines for a piece-meal reform in a broad set of areas. An effort has
been made to analyse the framework of bureaucratic order and identify areas where
reform is urgently needed. To arrest the process of decay in the bureaucratic
institutions and to make a turnaround, a partnership among professionals,
bureaucrats and academia is a desirable goal for building an environment and
framework for reform. Secondly, to bring about an attitudinal change and improve
the skills of civil servants, strengthening of training institutions is a must. Thirdly,
devolution of power in the districts and redefining the power structure of the federal
secretariat is essential. Fourthly, the salary package for the civil servant is out of tune
with financial realities, it needs a drastic revision, if we aim to reduce corruption,
injustice and improve the efficiency of the public servant. Fifth, most importantly,
political leadership and bureaucracy need to develop a transparent and effective
partnership for promoting public interest and ensuring humane governance. An
adversarial relationship between the two or an interlocking to protect the vested
interest of privileged groups only, would mar the growth of robust institutions,
undermine effective governance and consolidation of democracy. Finally it must be
understood and appreciated that civil service is a profession where one is expected to
work for the welfare of the fellow citizens, it is not simply managerial
professionalism, it has a ethical and human dimension—welfare of the fellow
citizens.
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